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1 - Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to appraise the Regionalisation of Portugal 
from the economic point of view. With a population of about 10 million people, 
Portugal only has Central Government and Local Government administrative 
levels and now seeks to introduce an intermediate regional level. The creation 
of administrative regions is included in the Constitution and has been regulated 
by a law approved by the Assembleia da Republica (Law 56/91 of 13th Au-
gust). But, the regions have not been established yet and there is no wide 
consensus on the matter. 
Regionalisation is mainly a political problem which involves the balance of 
the distribution of power (and financial resources) between the capital and the 
regional urban centres. Here it is treated instead as an economic problem: how 
to efficiently allocate a set of administrative functions in space to maximize scale 
economies and minimize transport and communication costs? 
Economic efficiency is dealt with here, e. g., the location of administrative 
functions which minimize the sum of production and transport costs. Pontes 
(1987) argues that in spatial economy, efficiency and maximisation of social 
welfare (measured by the aggregate surplus of consumers and productive units) 
are only in harmony in the specific case where demand for the administrative 
function is inelastic in relation to transport and communication cost. Otherwise 
the maximisation of social welfare entails a further decentralisation with relation 
to the level which follows from efficiency. In this paper, for the sake of simplic-
ity, it is assumed that the inelasticity of demand with relation to transport cost 
holds. A second preliminary question is the rationality of administrative decen-
tralisation at a time when transport and communication costs drop so sharply. 
Traffic speed on motorways has increased by about 30 % as a result of recent 
investment in infrastructure in Europe (Bruinsma and Rietveld, 1993). In Portu-
gal more than 2200 km of high speed roads were built during the period be-
tween 1985 and 1995 (see, among others, Brito,1994, and Porto, 1996). The 
number of telephones has doubled during the last decade, and the pricing of 
telephone calls has recently been changed to allow a decrease of the price of 
inter-urban calls in relation to local calls .. In spite of the importance of this kind 
of progress, I do not believe that the improvement of the Transport and Tel-
ecommunication systems is a substitute for the decentralisation of administra-
tive functions, although it behaves in this way in the model presented below. 
The reason is that the decrease of transport costs is matched by an increase in 
the elasticity of demand in relation to transport cost, that is, for a «quest for 
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proximity». Proximity not only means low travel time but also entails properties 
of «flexibility» and «adjustment» which are expressed by the statement that «near 
is beautiful» (see Alves, 1996; Porto, 1996, and Lopes, 1995). 
The comment that Tocqueville (1856) made about the French Revolution 
may be applied to the Portuguese Regionalisation. In both cases, a major politi-
cal change only made a preexisting de facto change explicit. In the French case 
administrative centralisation was already achieved before the Revolution, while 
in Portugal the decentralisation of administrative functions was accomplished long 
before the Administrative Regions were set up. 
In mainland Portugal (1), a de facto regional decentralisation took place 
which was mainly due to three factors (see Barreto, 1995; Lopes, 1996; 
Reis, 1995). 
The per capita GOP of Portugal evolved from 53,9 % in 1986 of the Com-
munity average to 67,9 % in 1995 (Porto, 1996). 
Firstly, local governments gained a considerable amount of both political 
and economic power, in relation to the Central Government. Then, the economic 
environment changed toward a more extensive decentralisation of decision-tak-
ing due to the growth of per capita income (2), the liberalisation of the economic 
system and the opening of the frontiers with full membership of the European 
Community in 1986, which additionally increased the amount of regional funds. 
Finally, There was much administrative decentralisation at regional level with the 
creation of Planning Regions (North, Centre, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo, 
Algarve) with Regional Coordinating Commissions. Furthermore, many of the 
services of Central Government Ministries have been regionalised. Reis sum-
marises this evolution: 
[ ... ] there is already a de facto regionalisation (which is obviously dif-
ferent from effective regionalisation) and that it neither generated 
new frontiers nor cut the country in pieces. [Reis 1996.] 
The realisation that regionalisation has already taken place de facto (a view 
which is shared by almost every specialist in the field) may lead to two oppos-
ing policies. Opponents. of the election of regional decision boards say that it is 
<<unnecessary» because an effective decentralisation has already taken place. 
On the other hand, the supporters of regiona!isation will say that it is necessary 
to make the recent decentralising trends explicit. 
In this paper, an attempt is made to obtain an upper bound to the decen-
tralisation of functions in terms of economic efficiency. A closed economy with 
two regions is assumed: a «core>> (with a larger population) and a «periphery» 
(with a smaller population) connected by a transport line involving a positive cost. 
It is assumed that the economy produces three goods: A (for «agricultural good»); 
L (for «low admnistrative function») and H (for «high admnistrative function»). 
(1) The islands of Azores and Madeira have autonomous regional governments long 
time ago. · 
(2) The per capita GOP of Portugal evolved from 53,9 % in 1986 of the Community average 
to 67,9% in 1995 (Porto, 1996). 
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In this context, the importance of location for efficiency depends on the 
existence of both positive fixed costs (scale economies) and transport costs. In 
order to simplify the analysis, good A can be excluded from the aggregate out-
put because it is produced under constant returns to scale, meaning that its 
production takes place in both regions. 
Function His more central than function L, in the sense that the purchase 
of one unit of H implies fewer trips per unit of time than L does. A function is 
decentralised to the «periphery» if the transport cost involved in the concentra-
tion overcomes the additional fixed cost that follows from decentralisation. It is 
assumed that the demand of each good in any region is an increasing function 
of its aggregate income. 
In period 0 {the present), function L has alteady been decentralised. The 
likelihood of decentralising the high-order function in period 1 further is bounded 
from above by the rate of increase of the aggregate income. As this rate varies 
considerably between regions, the degree of feasible regionalisation is very 
heterogeneous. 
Were the legal framework of regionalisation completely flexible, this kind of 
heterogeneity would not constitute a problem. However as the regulatory law 
(Law 56/91 of 13 August) of regions lays down a certain degree of uniformity, 
the same degree of regionalisation will be inefficient for some regions. 
This kind of inefficiency can be minimised if the establishment of regions is 
made as flexible as possible within the present legal framework. If this goal cannot 
be fully achieved it is preferable to create large regions instead of small slow-
growth regions which would be burdened (rather than helped) by the regional 
institutions. 
2 - An economic model for regionalisation 
A closed economy with the following assumptions is assumed: 
H1) It is a spatial economy made up of two regions: the «core» (with 
a larger population) and the «periphery» (with a smaller popula-
tion). The regions are connected by a road which involves a 
positive travel cost t in the distance between them. It is assumed 
that intraregional transport costs are zero. 
f-f2.) Technology is described by a linear cost function: 
C(Q) = F+ wQ (1) 
where F~ 0 is a fixed cost and w is a (constant) marginal cost. 
If the fixed cost is positive, this cost function involves increasing 
returns; 
/-13) The economy produces three goods which are named: A (for «ag-
ricultural good»); L (for «low order admnistrative good»); and H 
(for «high order admnistrative good•• ). Therefore, fixed costs 
(FA,FL'FH) are defined for each kind of good. For each kind of 
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good, we also define a parameter n which is an inverse product-
specific measure of transportability. Parameter n can be defined 
as the number of trips per unit of time that a consumer located 
in a region has to make in order to be able to buy one unit of a 
good which is supplied in the other region. The transport cost of 
a good can be expressed in a multiplicative way as: 
t· n (2) 
where t measures road quality and n measures (inversely) prod-
uct transportability; 
H4) Production of good A entails constant returns to scale (that is, FA 
is zero). Therefore, its location remains fixed in time, so that good 
A is produced in both regions. For the purpose of locational 
analysis good A can be excluded from the aggregate product of 
both regions. Therefore, it is assumed henceforth that the econo-
my's product is only made by goods L and H; 
H5) Good H is more central that good L in the sense in the sense 
that it is more transportable, therefore: 
nH< nL (3) 
To obtain an example of the relationship between goods H 
and L, assume that function L consists of the decision on a 
subsidy of 5000 cantos and that H consists of a decision on a 
subsidy of 20 000 cantos. The later subsidy is more difficult to 
obtain because it is decided at a higher level of public adminis-
tration. However, if if the intention is to obtain 20 000 cantos by 
demand function L, an application must be made four times and 
the same number of trips must be made, while it is only neces-
sary to travel once if the use of function H is chosen; 
1-/6) The demand function for each good is similar to the Keynesian 
consumption function. The quantity demanded of a good in a 
region is an increasing function of the aggregate income in that 
region (3). The share of the more central good (H) increases with 
per capita income. The demand for the high-order good (H) is 
strictly lower than the demand for the low-order good (L) (4). 
It is easy to conclude that the location of a function involves a trade-off. Its 
concentration in the «core>> maximizes scale economies while decentralisation 
to the «periphery>> minimizes transport costs (5). 
(3) For the sake of the calculation of aggregate income it is assumed that the goods are 
equally priced at the constant marginal cost. This implies that fixed costs are covered by a subsidy. 
(4) These assumptions are common in central place literature. 
(5) Concentration in the «periphery» is obviously never efficient. 
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The total cost (production plus transport) of providing a good with produc-
tion being concentrated at the «Core» is: 
F + w(Dc+ DP) + (t· n)DP (4) 
where: 
D c = Demand for the good at the «core»; 
DP =Demand for the good at the «periphery». 
The total cost of providing the good with decentralisation is: 
2F+ w(Dc+ DP) (5) 
Therefore, the condition of efficiency of decentralisation given (4) and (5) 
is: 
F+ w(Dc+ DP) + (t· n)Dp"?.2F+ w(Dc+ DP) (6) 
which simplifies to: 
F<t-n·D - p (7) 
that is, decentralisation allows a saving of transport costs on the amount of 
goods demanded by the peripherical consumers, but involves an additional 
fixed cost. 
Economic progress exerts two contradictory influences upon the incentive 
to decentralise (as measured by the right of 7). On the one hand, the improve-
ment of Transport decreases the benefits od decentralisation. On the other hand, 
economic growth increases the demand for the goods supplied in the core re-
gions by consumers in the periphery thereby creating an incentive tor «import 
substitution». 
Following the dynamic central place model according to Beckmann {1995), 
this kind of evolution can be described using a two-period model. At the present 
time (in period 0), some decentralisation has already taken place, therefore the 
provision of good L in the periphery is marginally efficient. From (7) (with equal-
ity), we have: 
where: 
FL = t0 • nL (1 - %) Y0 
Y0 is the aggregate income of the «periphery» in period 0; 
% is the share of good H in aggregate income in period 0. 
By desegregating income (8) becomes: 
where: 
FL =to. nL (1- %)Po Yo 
y0 - per capita income in the <<periphery» in period 0; 
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It is assumed that demand for good H increases between period 0 and 
period 1 so that the supply of H in the «periphery» breaks even: 
FH= t1 nH q1P1 Y1 (10) 
If y1 > y0 (a similar reasoning with Yo > y1 leads to the same result), then 
q1 > %· Then (9) becomes: 
FL >to. nL (1- q1)PoYo 
Dividing (1 0) by (11) term by term, the result is: 
FH < (!J._J(nH)(~)(p1)(Y1 J 
FL l to lnL 1 q1 Po Vo 
As by assumption q1 < __!__, (11) can be written as: 2 
FH < (!J._J(nHJ(P1](Y1J 





K = nH rate of increase in centrality by the ••periphery» during periods 
nL 
0 and 1; 
G = FH rate of increase of public expenditure in indivisibilities in the 
FL 
«periphery» between periods 0 and 1; 
rr,rp,ry= rates of increase of transport cost, population and per capita 
income (tor instance, rr= t1 ~to J. 
Then (13) can be written as (6): 
K < (1 + r,)(1 Hp)(1 Hy) 
1-% 
(14) 
As the improvement of Transport and Communication systems means that 
rr is negative (14) can be further be simplified: 
(15) 
(6) The central place literature, which is followed here, assumes that goods have a private 
nature, so that the supply of a good in a region depends on the demand associated with the size 
of population. On the other hand, in a model with local public goods, the provision of the goods 
would determine (rather than being explained) the regional population (I am indebted to Brandao 
Alves for this remark). 
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Expression (15) means that in order to be efficient the increase of central-
ity in the «periphery» has an upper bound which depends positively on the rates 
of the increase of population and per capita income, and negatively on the rate 
of increase of public expenditure (). 
3 - Regionalisation ·as an economic problem 
During the last decade, while the population has stagnated and even slightly 
decreased, per capita income in Portugal has increased sharply as was remarked 
above. According to the upper bound to the rise of centrality in the «periphery» 
in r. h. s. of (15), regionalisation is efficient provided that three conditions are 
met: 
1) The growth of per capita income in the country should be high 
enough to compensate for demographic decline; 
2) This kind of growth should be homogeneously distributed across 
the regions of the country; 
3) Public expenditure linked to the financing of fixed costs which are 
incurred due to the decentralisation of public services should not 
rise beyond control. 
While no one questions assumption 1) (although its fulfillment is not granted), 
questioning 2) and 3) lies in the root of the criticism of regionalisation. 
Cavaco Silva said that the legal creation of the regions will cause an es-
calation in public expenditure [that is, a high value of G in (15)], thus reducing 
the scope for efficiency in regionalisation. This argument, while impressive, is 
not very well founded, because many public services have already been decen-
tralised, particularly many departments of Ministries and the admnistrative struc-
tures which support the already existing Comissoes de Coordenavao Regional. 
It can be argued (Reis, 1996; Lopes, 1995) that regionalisation will allow an 
integration and rationalisation of these structures, economies thus appearing which 
permit the value of G in (15) to be even lower than the unity. This goal of cost 
efficiency can be achieved if an orientation of «light structure» is adopted tor 
the regional boards (Porto, 1996}. Concretely, this means that the region should 
decide the timing, location and general scope of investment projects rather than 
executing and managing them (and the infrastructure thereby resulting as well} (8). 
The other objection to decentralisation, which concerns the differences 
between demographic and regional growth, is more serious and has been raised 
by Barreto (1996) among others. The following table gives the rates of popula-
tion growth, per capita income and aggregate income in the five Portuguese 
planning regions and is based on data contained in Porto (1996). 
(l) Note that the efficiency of regionalisation can not only be appraised according to its impact 
in public expenditure, contrar)i to the advice recently given by the former Portuguese PM, Cavaco 
Silva. 
(8) I am indebted to Mendes Baptista for this specific point. 
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Regional demographic (rp) and economic growth (ry) rates in Portugal 1981/1991 
Regions 
North ........................................................ . 
Centre ...................................................... . 
Lisbon and Tag us Valley ........................ . 
Alentejo .................................................... . 
Algarve ..................................................... . 
Portugal (Mainland) ................................. . 
























For a given G [in (15)], the differences between the rates of ·.population 
growth and per capita income growth determine great differences in the eco-
nomic feasibility of decentralisation. These differences would not be a problem 
if the institutional format of regionalisation were more flexible. 
However, the Law which regulates regionalisation (Law 56/91 of 13th Au-
gust) is quite rigid: the Regions are created simultaneously by a law from the 
Assembleia da Republica, and they have identical boards (an executive board 
called the Junta Regional and a legislative named Assembleia Regional). This 
rigidity is reinforced by the recent idea of a national referendum on regionalisation. 
The only differentiation between regions which is introduced by the law only 
concerns the number of members of the regional boards and is only based in 
static criteria (like the population of the region) rather than on dynamic criteria 
(e. g., the rate of population growth). According to our analysis this kind of dif-
ferentiation is clearly unsuitable. 
Therefore, condition 15 and the table above show that any unique (com-
mon) level of decentralisation can only be efficient for one region, thus leading 
to undesirable outcomes for the other regions. If the level of decentralisation 
that fits high growth regions (namely the Northen region) is chosen, low growth 
regions (Centre and Alentejo) will experience a dramatic rise in fixed costs. If 
the opposite position prevails, the North will remain burdened by its depend-
ency on Lisbon. 
4 - Policy solutions to the dilemmas of regionalisation 
The solution to the problem outlined above lies in a flexibilisation of the 
regional administration, which adapts each one to the specific scale economies/ 
transport cost trade-off faced by each region. The regional decision-makers would 
have the same power in every region, but the consulting and technical support 
functions would be outsourced to private enterprises as much as possible. De-
pending on the region and on the centrality of the function, the project that 
supports the decision could be outsourced either to a local or to a central pri-
vate consultant (based in Lisbon or Porto), depending on market criteria. 
If this kind of organisational flexibility is not achievable, the solution is to 
minimize the differentials in economic and demographic dynamics among regions 
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by means of an adequate regional division. An extreme «Solution» would be to 
avoid regionalisation at all, which we do not consider advisable. An intermediate 
proposal would be to keep the present planning regions, which are large and 
internally heterogeneous, thus avoiding the formation of regions (such as Baixo 
Alentejo, Norte Interior and Centro Interior) with very low economic and demo-
graphic dynamics. 
5 - Conclusion 
The economic problem which is implicit in regionalisation is modeled ac-
cording to central place theory in a dynamic framework, as introduced by 
Beckmann (1995). The economic opportunity for the decentralisation of the sup-
ply of a good results from the interplay of scale economies (which lead to spa-
tial concentration) and transport costs (which lead to decentralisation). It is con-
cluded that efficient decentralisation in a region has an upper bound which 
depends positively on regional economic and demographic growth and depends 
inversely on the increase of indivisibilities which it is associated with. Therefore, 
the major economic problem implicit in regionalisation involves the contrast be-
tween the institutional projected uniformity of regions on the one hand and the 
deep asymmetries in economic and demographic growth among them in the 
recent past on the other hand. 
The real solution to this dilemma would to flexibilise the institutional format 
of the regions, with the maximisation of the outsourcing of technical support 
functions. If this is not completely possible, there should be a purposeful re-
gional division that minimizes the extent of interregional asymmetries. 
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